Please don’t report security problems in public issues, discussions or pull requests.
Report them privately through GitHub: on this repository’s Security tab, choose Report a vulnerability. That opens a private advisory that only the maintainer can see.
Please include what you found, how to reproduce it (the request, the config, the Mr Onion commit), and what an attacker could do with it.
What to expect. Mr Onion is maintained by one person, so responses are best effort: an acknowledgement within a week, then updates in the advisory until it is fixed or declined with a reason. Once a fix lands, the advisory is published with credit to the reporter, unless you’d rather not be named.
Versions are numbered from 0.2.0 (see docs/decisions/workflow-and-ci-backlog-2026-10-26.md,
TFP-257), but only the current main branch is supported. Fixes are not
backported.
Mr Onion is a local, single-user developer tool. It is not designed to be deployed, shared on a network or exposed to the internet.
POST /api/run runs the Playwright suite
it is given, as the user who started Mr Onion, with that user’s file and
network access. This is the product working as intended under the local
model (Phase 16, docs/decisions/phase-16-local-first-decision-record.md),
not a bug to be patched. There is no login, no multi-user isolation and
no sandbox.127.0.0.1 only, and its API refuses requests whose
Host or Origin isn’t Mr Onion’s own local address and writes
(POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE) whose body isn’t application/json,
so a web page open in the same browser
can’t drive it. Don’t override the address, and don’t put it behind a
tunnel, a reverse proxy or port forwarding: anyone who can reach the port
can run code on the machine.127.0.0.1 only (MinIO 9000 and 9090, Plane’s 80, the Toolshop’s
4200, 8091, 8000 and 3306). Don’t change the bound address. Their committed
credentials (.env.development, docker-compose.yml, and Testsmith’s
MariaDB root password root) are well-known development placeholders, not
secrets; change them, in .env for Plane, before running either stack
anywhere else.| Area | What it does | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Generated tests | Read-only by default: a request guard blocks non-GET traffic to the target unless a run turns on the interactive gate; data-changing and attack-shaped tests need a typed ownership confirmation (Phase 43, not yet built: until then they don’t run) | src/lib/run/, docs/decisions/phase-38-*, phase-43-* |
| Model-written tests | Restricted to the page and expect: imports, Node APIs, non-GET requests, routes and code built at run time are refused before running. This is a filter, not a sandbox; the Docker sandbox is Phase 45 |
src/lib/gap-writer/, docs/decisions/phase-45-* |
| The gap writer | Calls the Claude Code CLI with every tool and MCP server off, without this machine’s CLAUDE.md, auto memory or hooks (--safe-mode), from an empty temporary folder, with the page’s text marked as untrusted data |
src/lib/gap-writer/writers.ts |
| Child processes | Every Playwright run gets only the environment Playwright needs, plus the proxy settings when set: no API keys, tokens or Mr Onion settings. A test can read a proxy setting, so a password in a proxy URL is within its reach | src/lib/run/child-env.ts |
| Credentials | Login credentials come only from environment variables; they’re redacted from every report, log and saved file; a run’s signed-in session file lives in a per-run folder outside the evidence and is deleted when the run’s process ends | src/lib/run/auth.ts, redact.ts, docs/decisions/phase-20-* |
| Load on target sites | Hosts other than local ones are capped: at most 3 workers sharing 5 requests per second | src/lib/run/host-limits.ts, request-cap.ts |
| Local data | Run history, site suites and candidates (target URLs and page structure; from Phase 43, ownership confirmations and their contact email) stay in the local data folder, never in the repo | src/lib/storage/data-dir.ts |
| Browser hardening of the UI | Content-Security-Policy without unsafe-eval in production, frame-ancestors 'none' |
next.config.ts |
Mr Onion sends real traffic to the sites it tests. Only test sites you own
or have permission to test, or the public practice sites listed in
docs/decisions/practice-site-targets-2026-10-19.md. Standard runs are
designed not to be intrusive, but they are still automated traffic.
npm audit --omit=dev). Dev tooling isn’t checked: Allure’s
and ESLint’s chains carry advisories npm audit fix can’t clear.emil3663/testforge to
emil3663/mr-onion (Phase 48). GitHub redirects the old address only
while no repository takes that name, so nothing is ever created again as
emil3663/testforge, by this account or anyone else.